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The channels of interstate commerce became deeper last
month when the stream of labor litigation emerged with the
stamp of constitutionality.' Even before this important an-
nouncement, proponents of the President's court reorganization
plan ventured early rejoicing when the Court "fell into line"
with the Railway Labor Act decision.! To characterize the deci-
sion as one gained under pressure and as personal victory does
great injustice to the Court; for such prejudice overlooks the
fact that the basis of decision in the steel,' trailer,' Associated
* The author is indebted to Professor Edwin Borchard of the Yale Uni-
versity School of Law for guidance in the preparation of this article.
t A.B., University of Southern California, 1935; second year student,
Yale University School of Law.
' National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 57
Sup. Ct. Rep. (1937); National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer
Company, id., 64z; National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Co., id., 645; Washington, etc. Coach Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, id., 648; Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board,
id., 650.
These cases were decided under the Wagner Labor Relations Act [Act of
July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. at L. 449, c. 372, z9 U.S.C. Sec. 1511, Section I of
which provides as follows: "The denial by employers of the right to organize
and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining
lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the
intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a)
impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of com-
merce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow of raw
materials or manufactured or processed goods from or into the channels of
commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in commerce; or (d) caus-
ing the diminution of employment and wages in such volume as substantially
to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into the channels of
commerce."
I Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 57 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592
(1937), upholding collective bargaining for railway employees as provided
by the Railway Labor Act.
- National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., note
I, supra.
4 National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., note 1, supra.
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Press, and clothing6 cases is not entirely new but has been sup-
ported and fostered by other similar phases of development
under the commerce clause!7 For a number of years business
whose life is movement, which draws raw products in to be
processed and sent out through the channels of interstate com-
merce and which depends for its life upon that commerce has
been properly subjected to federal protection.
This is the "current of commerce" doctrine,8 drawn upon
to sustain the government in the case of Stafford v. Wallace.9
There under the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, federal
supervision was imposed upon the business of commission men
and livestock dealers. In answer to the claim that a purely
intrastate matter was being regulated, it was pointed out that
"the object to be secured by the act is the free and unburdened
flow of live stock from the ranges and farms of the West and
the Southwest through the great stockyards . . . and thence in
the form of meat products to the consuming cities of the
country... ""
The Stockyards cases and others to be mentioned later 1 pro-
vide language which is indicative of federal expansion in inter-
state commerce leading to the recent Labor cases. Business
dependent upon movement is not a new subject of regulation,
' Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, note a, supra.
6 National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co.,
note I, sup-a.
7 The clause reads: "Congress shall have Power to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 3. Congressional control of foreign and
Indian commerce has generally been regarded as absolutely subordinate to the
sovereignty of the federal government. It is with respect to interstate com-
merce that federal power has been constantly challenged and defined. The
Wagner Labor Act decisions have again provoked controversy and speculation,
furnishing incentive to survey the trend of federal expansion under the inter-
state aspect of the commerce clause.
' This theory was first announced by Mr. Justice Holmes in Swift & Co.
v. United States, j96 U.S. 375 (1905), discussed in Ribble, The Current of
Commerce: A Note on the Commerce Clause and the National Industrial
Recovery Act, 18 Minn. L. Rev. 296, 31Z (1934).
9 258 U.S. 495 (92z).
1° Id, 5 14 311 See PP- 3 1 8, 3 1 9, infra.
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though power in this field has in the past been exercised cau-
tiously and with no certain predictability of standard. 2 The
recent decisions have deepened the channels of commerce to
include labor relations in business concerns which are dependent
to some degree upon movement for consummation of their
transactions, but it now seems that this movement need not
meet such a particularized doctrine as the "current of com-
merce." It is apparent that a great number of manufacturing
establishments heretofore considered essentially local' and sub-
ject therefore to state control will, because of their newly recog-
nized affiliation with movement, yield at least their labor prob-
lems to national surveillance. However, in view of the Gaffey"4
and Schechter"5 decisions, one is not yet prepared to say that
regulation of hours, wages, and other conditions of labor have
become subject to federal control merely because collective
bargaining, one aspect of a business, has been declared to
"affect" interstate commerce.
When the suggestion is made that aspects of trade may be
commerce for one purpose and not for another, one suspects
that a teleological classification can be made of federal expan-
12 Congressional regulation of business as related to movement is well
developed in Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One,
47 Harv. L. Rev. 1335 (I934).
"'The following statement in Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. x, 2o (1888),
though rising as a case involving state power, is typical of the long-accepted
doctrine that manufacturing is essentially of local concern: "Manufacture is
transformation-the fashioning of raw materials into a change of form for use.
The functions of commerce are different. . . . If it be held that the term
(commerce) includes the regulation of all such manufactures as are intended to
be the subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny
that it would also include all productive industries that contemplate the same
thing. The result would be that Congress would be invested, to the exclusion
of the states, with the power to regulate, not only manufacture, but also agri-
culture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries, mining-in short, every
branch of human industry. For is there one of them that does not contemplate,
more or less clearly, an interstate or foreign market? Does not the wheat
grower of the Northwest, and the cotton planter of the South, plant, cultivate,
and harvest his crop with an eye on the prices at Liverpool, New York, and
Chicago ?"
'- Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
11 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (935).
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sion under the commerce power. " The ends which have been
deemed valid by the Court and to meet which legislation has
been framed, sincerely or ostensibly in an attempt to secure
national growth, include (I) protection and promotion of inter-
state commerce itself' (2) denial of commerce to articles and
persons whose delivery through commerce would effect an im-
moral, unhealthful, or deceitful influence upon the people"
(3) encouragement of proper intrastate control by bending com-
merce to the purposes of the states.'9 This classification fur-
nishes a workable pattern by which to chart the national trend.
But before going too specifically into the matter, it would be
well to see why a teleological explanation is necessary at all.
Recent writers" have held the commerce power to be ple-
16 A careful analysis of the growing federal police power has been made
by Profesor Cushman in National Police Power under the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution, 3 Minn. L. Rev. 289, 381, 452 (1919). The development
of national power is pursued in this article through the Child Labor Cases.
m Cushman, note 16, supra, 289.
'
8 Id., 38 1.
1d., 452.
20 Corwin in The Commerce Power versus States Rights (936) attempts
to rebut six propositions supported by the Court:
(i) That the framers of the Constitution conferred upon Congress the
power to regulate commerce among the States with a different intent than the
power to regulate foreign commerce, with the result that the former power is
of less scope than the latter power.
(2) That the power to regulate commerce among the States does not
comprise the power to prohibit it.
(3) That while Congress has power to restrain commerce among the
States for the benefit of such commerce this power is not available for the
promotion of the general welfare in other respects.
(4) That the reserved powers of the States constitute a limitation upon
Congress's power to regulate commerce among the States and serve to with-
draw certain matters from the jurisdiction of the latter power.
(5) That production is a subject which is segregated to the reserved
-power of the States, and so lies outside the range of Congress's power to regu-
late commerce among the States.
(6) That Congress's purpose in enacting a measure is a judicially enforc-
ible test of the validity of such measure ift it invades the ordinary domain of
the States.
The author attempts to show that these propositions are historically
unwarranted and therefore represent a lack of understanding or wilful error
on the part of the Court. It is submitted that the author has given too much
attention to comparing the language of the various decisions without consid-
THE COMMERCE POWER 311
nary, have deplored the Court's conservatism in narrowing
implied powers which early might have led to a strong federal
control of all business. The argument is made that at the time
the Constitution was adopted the word "commerce" meant not
merely movement but a variety of transactions affecting busi-
ness beyond state lines.21 The wide connotation of the word, it
is contended, would have produced a field of federal supremacy
sufficiently broad to include and wipe out all distinctions made
with respect to the functions of commerce and its effects. Con-
sideration of the historical enactment of the commerce clause
and the diplomatic functions of the Supreme Court may point
out the reason for such supposed restrictions.
The concern of the Constitutional Convention was primarily
to eliminate the jealousies of the states which had worked
mutual hardships through tariffs, port duties, and restrictive
licenses. The Articles of Confederation had failed to provide
this needed harmony, with the result that in September, i786,
five states met at Annapolis to "take into consideration the trade
of the United States; to examine the relative situation and trade
of said states; to consider how far the uniform system in their
commercial regulations may be necessary to their common
interest and their permanent harmony; and to report to the
several states such an act relative to this great object... ""
It was at once apparent that an effective regulation of com-
merce would demand a complete reorganization of the govern-
eration of the facts giving rise to them and consequently has frequently con-
fused dicta and holding. For example, the author cites Gibbons v. Ogden
for the proposition that the power given by the commerce clause is plenary
and exclusive in all instances. Id., 24 et seq. The facts of the case concern
merely regulation of an interstate waterway-a field in which national interest
predominates to the exclusion of any state action whatsoever. As to such an
exclusive field of commerce, federal power is possessed of all the characteristics
named by Marshall. That these same characteristics would exist if the com-
merce power were applied to other subjects is merely dictum and is unfairly
used to accuse the court of retraction of supposed early liberalism.
21 Hamilton, Walton H., and Adair, Douglas, The Power to Govern
(1937) is the most recent work dealing with this problem.
22 Virginia, leader of the movement, gave this instruction to her commis-
sioners. x Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution, I 5 (2d ed. 1836).
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ment, and members of the Annapolis group took steps to bring
about the Federal Convention at Philadelphia in May, 1787.'
Finding its immediate incentive in a proposed regulation of
commerce, the Convention soon set about to remedy the defects
of the Articles of Confederation." The objective of the meet-
ing soon formed about the early resolution of Randolph:
That the National Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the
Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation and more-
over to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent,
or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by
the exercise of individual legislation.2"
The delegated powers were assumed to be necessary for
embracing matters which extended beyond state lines-which
states, therefore, could not regulate with effectiveness." Since
the grant in regard to commerce is the only broad power over
business and trade mentioned, it is believed by some that the
framers intended all business of national import to be subject
to federal regulation. In support of this argument, the defini-
23 Id., I 19.
24 The Articles gave no centralized control over commerce, with the result
that the individual state's bargaining power abroad was slight and gained
advantage only at the pleasure of foreign nations. Great Britain, for example,
excluded American vessels from participation in her West Indies trade. At
home, the states with valuable ports and waterways imposed upon neighboring
states less favorably situated. "Some of the States," as Madison has described,
"having no convenient ports for foreign commerce were subject to be taxed by
their neighbors, through whose ports their commerce was carried on. New
Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and New York, was likened t8 a cask
tapped at both ends; and North Carolina, between Virginia and South Caro-
lina, to a patient bleeding at both arms." Farrand, The Framing of the Con-
stitutio n (913) 7.
25 Madison's Debates, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., ist Sess. (I927)
117.2' The theory that the delegated powers should extend to matters not
capable of local control is supported even by those who opposed ratification of
the Constitution as it was framed. James Monroe in argument against ratifica-
tion is reported to have said: "What are the powers which the federal govern-
ment ought to have? I will draw the line between the powers necessary to be
given to the federal, and those which ought to be left to the state govern-
ments. To the former I would give control over the national affairs; to the
latter I would leave the care of local interests." 3 Elliot, op. cit., note 22,
supra, 214.
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ions of commerce current at the time of the Convention have
been set forth as denoting 'trade, traffic, buying and selling or
the exchange of goods,' with movement of goods as only one
of its connotations."27 Although our present understanding of
commerce is an "exchange of commodities" across state lines,
we must understand the word as it was used in the Constitution.
Perhaps it was intended, and we may concede the intention,
that an intrastate business not capable of being effectively regu-
lated by the state should be subjected to federal control, at least
for effects wholly national in character. The economy of 1787
did not define what businesses were national in import; in fact
it cannot reasonably be contended that the problem of interstate
business regulation was that primarily intended by the com-
merce clause, for the closely integrated system of the present
century had not yet emerged. Modern business organization,
therefor, is not a problem capable of historical interpretation.
The chief concern of the Fathers was to free the channels
of commerce. Conditions of transportation presented the first
and most obvious field affecting more states than one and was
that in which the jealousies of the states had been nurtured.
It is not strange, therefore, that movement in commerce has
been evolved as the controlling concept,"8 which identifies com-
merce essentially as movement and has developed the idea of
protection to movement, denial of movement to injurious
articles, and adaptation of movement to state needs. The orig-
inal meaning of commerce not only as movement but as business
affecting more states than one may be conceded and yet justifi-
cation made for the hesitation of the Court in withholding lib-
eral definitions of what constitutes business on a national scale,
or business in interstate commerce. Our new capitalistic society
27 Stern, note I 2, supra, 1346. The early dictionaries are cited as author-
ity for this statement: The American Encyclopedia (1798); Webster's Dic-
tionary (i8o6); Samuel Johnson's Dictionary (6th ed. 1785); Alexander's
Columbia Dictionary (i8oo); Perry's Royal Standard Dictionary ( 4th Am.
ed. 1796). The meaning ascribed to commerce here is supported by the
findings of Walton Hamilton, op. cit., note zi, supra.
28 See Stern, note i 2, supra, 1335 et seq.
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has effected an economy totally different from that previously
known. The definition of business on a national scale was some-
thing without precedent, to be approached with care, for the
implications of such holdings would undoubtedly be far-
reaching.
The Court has in reality not denied the initial definition of
the word "commerce" nor has it denied the supremacy of fed-
eral control of commerce when business of national import has
been involved. The Court has been cautious. It has been slow
to define what business, or aspect thereof, has reached the
degree of national character privileging an invocation of the
federal supremacy. Degree of national character influences the
Court's conception of what affects "movement."
The spirit of the Constitution is born of a dual conception of
government-state and national. The Constitution itself is
more deeply of dual nature-a law of words and a'law of impli-
cation, the latter of which is entrusted to the wisdom of men.
The judges have assumed the delicate task of weighing policies
from administration to administration, seeking to solidify the
implied law with care, to maintain the balance of dualism.
From the philosophy of dualism has developed the theory
that interstate commerce itself might be divided into two fields:
one in which national interests are paramount; the other in
which state interests control.2" The field in which national
interest predominates is said to be beyond state interference,
even in the silence of Congress. But the field in which state
interest predominates. is held open to state legislation until
Congress enters the field justifiably. Whether or not Congress
is justified in entering the state realm of interstate commerce is
passed upon by the Court according to the criterion reiterated
in the Wagner Act Steel case:
The authority of the federal government may not be pushed to such
an extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the commerce clause itself
20 See Wiloughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (iz929)
Sec. 594. The cases are cited and the rule dearly announced in Covington &
Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, zio-zz (1894).
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establishes, between commerce "among the several States" and the
internal concerns of a State. That distinction between what is national
and what is local in the activities of commerce is vital to the maintenance
of our federal system.3"
An incautious or too liberal interpretation of congressional
claims upon the field of state interest might have obliterated
the distinction between state and national government, or made
serious encroachments upon state administration before federal
machinery had been evolved or tested.3
The first assertion of federal power was made with respect
to the field of transportation in Gibbons v. Ogden, 2 there being
no doubt that regulation of traffic among the several states was
the most emphatic need." Thus first developed the ideology of
p otection to commerce. The protection of interstate commerce
first became of importance with the rise of the railroads and the
enactment of the Safety Appliance Act in 18932" The congres-
sional object was approved as "undoubtedly to safeguard inter-
state commerce, the life of passengers, and the life and limb of
employees engaged therein."" This and subsequent acts based
on the desire to protect the facilities of commerce were success-
ful from the start. Not only was mechanical safety encouraged,
but the Hours of Service Act of 19073" was also upheld to limit
the working day and to provide relief periods for railway work-
men. A danger to commerce from the inefficiency of tired
57 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6zi.
31 The difficulties connected with the enforcement of the Eighteenth
Amendment indicate the failure following upon inadequate federal organi-
zation.
9 Wheat. i (1824).
. That the problems of regulating "commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states" were deemed to concern the removal of barriers
obstructing the movement of goods across state lines is set forth by Hamilton
and Madison, The Federalist, Nos. VII, IX, XLII; 3 Eliott, op. cit., note 22,
supra, z6o.
:4 The constitutionality of the several measures involved was upheld by
the Supreme Court in St. Louis & R. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. z8I (1908).
United States v. AtI. Coast Line R., 214 Fed. 498, 499 (1913).
That the statute was not only constitutional but would exclude states
from legislating in the premises was the holding in Northern Pac. R. v. Wash-
ington, 272 U.S. 370 (912).
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employees was deemed parallel to that of defective couplers.
It is to be noted that this regulation was passed not to provide
a happier life for employees but again to protect commerce from
accidents that might result from human exhaustion.
The employers' liability statutes stepped into the realm of
humanitarian motives but clung to the "protection" ideology
for their approval.3" Congress, following the example of the
states which had enacted workmen's compensation laws, 8
wished to secure economic justice to railway men by eliminating
certain defences available to the employers in negligence suits
at common law. Only as relations of master and servant touch
upon commerce are they subject to federal regulation. 9 Thus,
the Court generously overlooked the well-known motivation,
preferring to be led to a favorable decision by argument of gov-
ernment counsel that "if the conditions under which the agents
or instrumentalities do the work of commerce are wrong or dis-
advantageous, those bad conditions may and often will prevent
or interrupt the act of commerce... ""
The theory of protection to commerce was strained to the
utmost in the interpretation of the Adamson law,41 requiring
37 The first Employers' Liability Act of 19o6 failed because it applied to
all employees of the railway whether or not they were connected directly with
processes of interstate commerce. Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463
(19o8). The' defect was cured by Congress and the result validated in the
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 2z3 U.S. I (191z). Backshop employees
were not deemed to be in interstate commerce under the second Liability Act.
Now the Virginian Ry. case, note 2, supra, declares such backshop employees
to be in interstate commerce for the purpose of collective bargaining. Thus a
question is raised as to whether the application of the Liability statute will be
similarly broadened.
38 The state compensation laws tend to fix the sum recoverable by em-
ployees for certain injuries; the Employers' Liability statute does not limit the
amount of recovery. See generally, Dodd, Administration of Workmen's
Compensation (1936) 16 et seq.
'9 This view, prevalent in the early legislation, caused the failure of the
Erdman Act, which made criminal the discharge of a railway employee for
membership in a labor organization. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(19o8). The Erdman Act was replaced by the Newlands Act of 1913, elim-
inating objectionable sections of the first legislation. The Virginian Ry. case,
note 2, supra, reverses the holding of the Adair case.
40 Second Employers' Liability Cases, 2z3 U.s. 48 (1912).
41 Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
payment of a ten-hour wage for an eight-hour working day.
This legislation was necessary to avoid a railway strike, which
if realized, would have impaired the effectiveness, at least
temporarily, of the greatest servant of commerce-the railway.
The protection to commerce includes not only guarding its
instrumentalities but removing obstructions from the path of
those instrumentalities. These obstructions may be direct, phys-
ical barriers or barriers more subtly imposed upon the free flow
of goods through the monopolistic organization of business.
The situation in Gibbons v. Ogden2 is typical of a direct ob-
struction which occurred through a state monopoly of commerce
at which the federal power was authorized to strike. A citizen
of the state of New York claimed the sole right to navigate the
Hudson by reason of an exclusive license from that state. Yet
the Court held that the connecting waterways of the United
States were exclusively within the federal jurisdiction which,
even in federal silence, permitted of no regulation by the states.
The desire to eliminate obstructions from commerce has
supported not only penal laws designed to preserve and protect
navigation,43 but also the enactment of anti-trust laws and pro-
hibitions against conspiracies of labor. Among the efforts to
prevent trusts and monopolies in commerce was the Interstate
Commerce Commission Act of 1887 and later amendments4
directed against rebating and other specific undesirable practices.
The Sherman Act of 189o, supplemented in 1914 by the Clay-
ton and Trade Commission Acts,"5 has led to governmental
supervision of combinations of capital. The relation to move-
ment in commerce was somewhat strained, but some such sup-
412 See note 3 z, supra.
43 A similar authority exists in regard to obstructions on land, as evidenced
by the Larceny Act of 1913, which makes criminal the breaking of seals of
railway cars containing interstate or foreign shipments. However, Congress
has relied for this protection upon the criminal laws of the states. See Cush-
man, note I6, supra, 304, 310.
44 See Willoughby, op. cit., note z9, supra, Sec. 49 z et seq. for a develop-
ment of federal control under the Act.
"1 Id., c. XVi.
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porting language was deemed necessary. The Sherman Act is
based on laissez-faire economics-that values and fair price
develop best through free competitive units. An attack upon
monopoly through federal supervision was believed the best
means of fostering free competition as a national policy, of pre-
serving a free flow of commerce through prevention of economic
paralysis of commerce by dominant capitalistic groups.
Although conceivably directed at capitalistic organizers
solely, both the Interstate Commerce and Sherman Acts have
been interpreted to include combinations of labor which were
in restraint of trade.4"
Within the narrow limits of the "flow of commerce" we
may see an expansion of federal power to collateral subjects.
Protection to commerce has supported federal specification of
mechanical equipment, limitation of hours of labor, such social
policy as the Employers Liability Act, and trade policies such
as the Interstate Commerce and Sherman Acts. Instead of
acknowledging freely that commerce did mean regulation of
national business, whether primarily or not dependent upon
movement, the Court has proceeded to justify national super-
vision of business on the pretense that Congress is acting with
the chief motive of removing obstructions to interstate move-
ment. It was said that the anti-trust laws freed movement of
articles in commerce; and in the field of trade regulation gen-
erally the language, "burden on commerce," has been the
source of judicial justification. Thus some local affairs may so
impinge upon commerce that these must be an incidental sub-
ject of congressional regulation. The Court has upheld detailed
46 A conspiracy to do acts prohibited by the Interstate Commerce Act was
effected by a brotherhood of locomotive engineers who had induced the
railroad for which they worked to join them in a boycott against another
railroad refusing to meet the demands of its men on strike. Toledo & R. v.
Penn. Co., 54 Fed. 730 (1893).
In Loewe v. Lawlor (Danbury Hatters Case), 2o8 U.S. 274 (I9O8),
laboring men instituting a secondary boycott were deemed such a combination
in restraint of trade as was prohibited by the Sherman Act.
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regulation not only of stockyards"7 but of grain exchanges"8
located in only a few cities but affecting business transactions
throughout the entire country. A corner upon the exchange of
cotton has been held to burden interstate commerce."9 The
Labor decisions likewise focus the interstate character of indus-
try. While the Court has prevented government interference
in local strikes when the only effect is indirectly to diminish or
delay shipment," it has sustained such interference in the Sec-
ondary Boycott Cases,"l where prices and competitive conditions
in various states would be affected and obviously where no state
could control the situation.
The decisions under the Wagner Act warrant government
interference to support collective bargaining because the unsat-
isfactory method of dealing with strikes has choked the flow of
commerce or impeded the operations of concerns causing unfor-
tunate economic results beyond state lines. That strict anology
to the flow of commerce has been departed from is indicated by
the statement of the Court that
We do not find it necessary to determine whether these features of
defendant's business dispose of the asserted analogy to the 'stream of
commerce" cases. Burdens and obstructions may be due to injurious
actions springing from other sources. 2
Thus in those industries whose national operations will be de-
layed by ineffectual dealings between employers and employees,
an aspect of interstate commerce is recognized.
The Gaffey and Schechter cases" are perhaps to be distin-
4 Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922); Tagg Bros. & Moorhead
v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (930).
*"'Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
41 United States v. Patten, 2z6 U.S. 525 (1913).
50 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (I92z);
United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457
(iqz4); and Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, z89 U.S. 103 (I933).
,1 Loewe v. Lawlor, 2o8 U.S. 274 (I9O8); Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal,
244 U.S. 459 (i917); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, z54 U.S. 443
(i9zi); and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n.,
274 U.s. 37 (1z97)-
57 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6Z4.
SSee notes 14 and 15, supra.
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guished on both these grounds. If the current of commerce
is a criterion, coal mining in Pennsylvania and wholesale dis-
position of chickens in New York may be characterized as out-
side this current since they exist at the beginning and end of
commerce respectively and do not represent an intermediate
or temporary point of abeyance. But even if we depart from
the current of commerce doctrine to the newly announced cri-
terion, still the Guffey and Schechter cases may be distin-
guished. The business organizations against which collective
bargaining was enforced in the Wagner cases were not all
strictly within the current of commerce. Yet the failure of these
organizations to recognize collective bargaining would have
caused economic fluctuations throughout the entire nation di-
rectly traceable to this failure. Thus, where the need for col-
lective bargaining even in a local industry is felt beyond state
lines, the right to regulate collective bargaining may be added
to the federal domain over interstate commerce. The Codes
attacked in the Guffey and Schechter cases were attempting to
regulate details of working conditions-hours of labor and
wages-and were not confined to the more general field of
enforcement of collective bargaining.
Federal action in the Wagner cases does not prescribe local
working conditions for an industry but authorizes collective
bargaining, which in a sense can be characterized as more funda-
mental and intrinsically national. It may be possible to allow
government regulation of collective bargaining alone without
further interference in the state's inherent police-power sov-
ereignty as to the details of labor. Working conditions may be
most amenable to local adjustment. Residents of one state
might prefer to develop certain details of working life in ac-
cordance with local need and advantage. 4 Bargaining power,
54 So, too, the policy of Congress in the Social Security Act was to allow
states freedom in choosing an unemployment insurance plan to meet local
preference. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the various plans see
Pike, Unemployment Insurance and Workmen's Compensation, IO So. Cal.
L. Rev. 253, 273 et seq. (1937).
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however, is a force which the worker must possess. If employ-
ees of large business concerns strike for this right, an obstruction
to commercial intercourse results of such national concern that
the source from which it arose, the desire for collective bargain-
ing, must be viewed as an aspect of interstate commerce.
The isolation of collective bargaining from industries here-
tofore considered local goes back to the dominance of state or
federal rights in a particular field." The state has yielded one
aspect of business-collective bargaining-yet still trusts the
wisdom of the Court in checking a hasty Congress from intrud-
ing too deeply. The power of the Court lies in pronouncing
upon the individual instances which come before it. As Mr.
Justice Hughes said in the steel case:
The Constitution does not forbid "cautious advance, step by step,"
in dealing with the evils which are exhibited in activities within the range
of legislative power. 6
Expansion of federal power has not been confined entirely
to the concept of protection to the flow of commerce but has
extended that protection to the public at large through certain
controls upon that movement. Nowhere within the constitu-
tional authorization is Congress empowered to legislate for the
general welfare, " yet regulation of the public morals and health
have been justified under the interstate commerce clause.
The famous Lottery case'8 is precedent for the contention
that Congress may exclude from commerce articles which,
" A field in which national interest predominates or comes to dominate
may be declared exclusively federal; fields in which state interests apparently
prevail will be deemed subject to state regulation until Congress overcomes the
presumption by stepping into the field.
G 57 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6z8.
'7 The words "general welfare" appear in Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. i of the
Constitution: "The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . ." "General welfare"
has been deemed a limitation upon spending under the taxing clause rather
than a substantive grant of power. The view of Hamilton, Madison, and
Story are contained in Corwin, Twilight of the Supreme Court (1934), c. i'.
and attempts to protect the people from deception and fraud
58 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
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though not harmful directly to commerce itself, nevertheless
may be excluded when their circulation tends to undermine the
public welfare. The purpose of the Lottery Act was twofold:
to protect the public and to enforce state prohibition of lotteries
by making impossible the importation of tickets through com-
merce. This decision does not assert that Congress may prohibit
any article entering upon commerce but only those which when
delivered will harm the public.
The exclusion of unfit and misbranded foods, 9 diseased
cattle,"' obscene literature,6' prize-fight films, 2 contraceptive
articles and information," enforce the principle announced in
the Lottery case.
The Mann Act of 191o, which forbade the transportation
of a woman across a state line for immoral purposes was likewise
sustained."4 The Motor Vehicle Theft Act was upheld"5 to pre-
vent furtherance of crime by denying facilities of commerce to
stolen cars. The recent kidnapping law" has expanded this
theory considerably by setting up an irrebuttable presumption
that a kidnapper who keeps his victim more than three days has
been using the facilities of interstate commerce, and that in
attempting to further his anti-social end through these means
becomes subject to federal authority.
Reverting to the language of Hoke v. Unzited States6 in
which the Mann Act was upheld, we find a rather sweeping
estimate of Congress' power under the commerce clause.
" Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 22o U.S. 45 (1911).
"9Reidv. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902).
"I See Balter, Some Observations Concerning the Federal Obscenity Stat-
utes, 8 So. Cal. L. Rev. 267 (1935).
62 Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325 (1915); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange,
Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (923).
62 United States v. Popper, 98 Fed. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1899).
64 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (917).
" Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
66 Sustained in Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (936). Cf.
Cowan, Ex parte Snatch, 31 II. L. Rev. 734 (1937).
67 See note 64, supra.
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The principle established by the cases is the simple one, when rid of
confusing and distracting considerations, that Congress has power over
transportation "among the several states," that the power is complete in
itself and that Congress as an incident to it, may adopt not only means
necessary but convenient to its exercise and the means may have the
quality of police regulations."
This statement is sufficiently comprehensive to erase the
objections raised in Hammer v. Dagenhar0 had it been ad-
hered to. The purpose of excluding from interstate commerce
products of child labor was to discourage the exploitation of
children in manufacturing. The deprivation of a market to
these goods would suffocate the abuse by indirection. Yet the
Court was unwilling to carry its scattered approvals of plenary
powers to a field where the advisability of federal entrance was
doubtful. Words of limitation were, therefore, used:
The grant of power to Congress over the subject of interstate com-
merce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it
authority to control the states in their exercise of the police power over
local trade and manufacture."
The Court was convinced that as to conditions of child labor,
local interests prevailed incontrovertably over national.
Another method of attack upon this problem is suggested,
however, by the policy of Congress to regulate movement in
commerce in such a way as to aid the states in their local pro-
grams." Certain reforms, originating in the states, may receive
protection and emphasis through federal legislation, when the
government itself would not be allowed to take the initiative
on the subject. Programs of national as well as state desirabil-
ity may be promoted in this way.
The states were early confronted with the delicate problem
of how to enforce their local views and how at the same time
to avoid burdening interstate commerce. The Court from the
as 227 U.S. 323 (1913).
r9 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
70 247 U.S. 273-274 (1918).
71 See generally Himbert & Stone, Congressional Assistance to the States
under the Commerce Power, 9 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. loi (1937).
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beginning was sympathetic and in the License Cases"2 decided
that a state could license or prohibit entirely sale in the original
package of liquor brought in from other states or from abroad.
But the success of the first legislation was overshadowed by two
later holdings. The first, Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern
Railway Co.," invalidated an Ohio statute which sought to
penalize railroads delivering liquor with knowledge that the
consignees were not authorized to sell. The second, Leisy v.
Hardin"4 overruled the License cases and denied the state the
privilege of regulating transactions in the original package.
Both these decisions were based on the holding that the subject
regulated was not available to the states when Congress in fact
had not released the field to them.
Steps were next taken by Congress to release the field with
the Wilson Act,"5 unsuccessful because of an unfortunate judi-
cial interpretation,"6 and further cooperation with the states was
effected by the Webb-Kenyon Act, which was successfully main-
tained in the case of Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland
Railway Co." Liquor was deemed to be in a class with lottery
tickets, an article whose movement in commerce would promote
immorality. Instead of prohibiting the transportation of all
liquor, the act made unlawful only shipments to those states
barring it locally. The Reed "Bone Dry" Amendment ex-
tended the prohibition to instances where a state had barred
72 5 How. 504 (1847). That goods brought in from foreign countries do
not become subject to the jurisdiction of the individual states was decided two
years previously in Brown, v. Maryland, 1z Wheat. 419 (1827).
73 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
74 135 U.S. OO (189o).
"
5 The Act provided that "intoxicating liquors . . . . transported into
any State or Territory or remaining therein . . . . shall upon arrival ....
be subject to the operation . . . . of the law of such State or Territory, and
shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in orig-
inal packages or otherwise." Act of Aug. 8, 189o, z6 Stat. at L. 313,
sustained in In, Re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
7' In Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898), arrival was interpreted to
mean delivery to a consignee and not arrival of shipment at a state line. This
construction made enforcement of the law difficult and ineffective.
7 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
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the sale of liquor, despite the fact that home consumption of
liquor might at the same time be legal."8 Congress has further
sought to cooperate with the states in the preservation of game
and has refused lawbreakers access to facilities of interstate
commerce in disposing of their goods."
The theory of cooperation with state legislation has been
advanced as the next ground upon which to rest child-labor
legislation. That such an attempt would be successful is sug-
gested by the analogous situation in respect to prison-made
goods. The Hawes-Cooper Act, construed in Whitfield v.
Ohio,0 required that all goods be labelled as to the prison and
state of their manufacture and that upon arrival in any state
they become subject to its laws. An extension of the doctrine is
embraced in the Ashurst-Sumners Act, which prohibits shipment
of prison-made goods to states banning their sale. The law was
approved in the recent case of Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v.
Illinois Central Railway Co."' The effect of these two acts is
to confine competition in prison-made goods to those states
allowing them a market and only upon such terms as are sanc-
tioned by the state in order that competitive conditions be some-
what equalized, or a market removed altogether. If Congress
should enact similar protection to states prohibiting or regulat-
ing child labor, the evil would be restricted at least to the states
which by the absence of legislation have indicated their willing-
ness to tolerate it.
A survey of federal expansion upon the judicial lines an-
nounced and developed will indicate a trend somewhat as fol-
lows: Congress, as we have seen, has acquired a general police
power and social control through legislation affecting transpor-
tation and its human agencies. This police-power influence has
7"This amendment to the Postoffice Appropriation Act of 1917 carried
federal cooperation to the extent of encroachment upon internal state regula-
tion. See United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420 (i919), and Cushman, note
16, supra, 409.
7" Rupert v. United States, 18I Fed. 87 (C.C.A. 8th, 191o).
80 297 U.S. 431 (936).
81 57 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277 (1937).
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been extended to the general public by refusal to allow com-
merce to consummate transactions harmful to the public. An
arbitrary manipulation of commerce to promote the general
welfare apparently has been barred by the doctrine of Hammer
v. Dagenhart.82 This decision prevented Congress from making
shipments in commerce dependent upon compliance with certain
standards of production prior to shipment. Yet policies of states
which are favored by Congress may be nurtured through regu-
lations of commerce, thus indirectly promoting a national pol-
icy. The most recent and most important aspects of interstate
commerce concern the regulation of business.
As has been pointed out, the word "commerce" may well
have meant not only movement but all transactions of business
extending from one state to another. There is evidence that
such was the meaning of the word and that the intent of the
Fathers was for the government to regulate trade when the
states could not effectively control such trade, or the aspects
thereof, because of their national import. Nevertheless, the
early and continued emphasis upon transportation led to an
interpretation that commerce meant essentially movement.
Although the field was thus narrowed, national need demanded
increased power, and the application of the commerce clause has
been gradually expanded. "Movement" language is still re-
sorted to in the Wagner Act cases, but a practical appraisal indi-
cates a broader view as to the factual conditions which "affect"
or "obstruct" the "movement" of commerce. That the national
aspects of a business and yet not its entire organization may be
subjected to federal regulation seems a likely interpretation of
the recent trend of decision. Thus is reserved to the states the
control of aspects of business more suitably regulated locally.
Studies in constitutional law through any rationale pre-
sented must recognize the responsibility with which the justices
are entrusted and realize that seeming incongruities in logic
may often be wisdom in policy. Had business early been de-
82 See note 63, supra.
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dared national in character, it is conceivable that the govern-
ment would have been lacking in the experience, resources, and
administrative technique necessary to cope with problems so
gigantic. The caution with which "commerce" has been ex-
panded through judicial sanction of what constitutes business
on a national scale, whether aided by the presence of movement
or not, is not to be discredited as ignorance by facetious writers
but rather would be more profitably understood in the Court's
desire to maintain the balance between federal and state power
which underlies the Constitution as the foundation of our pres-
ent system of government.
